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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to single out four main kinds of moralism, which 
might be associated to virtue ethics, and to offer a virtue-ethical response to each. By do-
ing so, I aim at defending virtue ethics, properly understood, from the intrinsic danger of a 
moralistic drift. I begin by proposing a definition of moralism and a list of its main forms. 
Then, I list the main features of the virtue-ethical perspective I embrace, and finally, I ar-
gue that such normative approach can prevent a moralistic drift. Thus, I conclude that a 
virtue-ethical approach, thanks to its capacity of reconciling reasons and motives, and to its 
proposing an agent-related perspective on morality, has an advantage in presenting moral 
requirements in a non-moralistic fashion. 
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As noted by Craig Taylor (Taylor 2012), moralism has a number of distinct 
meanings, ranging from legal theory to aesthetics, and can be addressed in 
just as many ways. From a strictly ethical perspective, the most noteworthy 
attempt to account for it, is Bernard Williams’ critique to impartialist theo-
ries, which refuse to recognize a space lying outside the scope of morality 
(Williams 1985). However, there seems to be a lack of reflection on such 
topic from a virtue-ethical standpoint. The aim of my paper is to single out 
four main kinds of ethical moralism (that is, of the moralism ascribable to an 
ethical judgement and/or theory), which might be associated to virtue ethics, 
and to offer a virtue-ethical response to each. By doing so, I aim at defending 
virtue ethics, properly understood, from the intrinsic danger of a moralistic 
drift, while at the same time rejecting Williams’ sharp division between the 
moral and the non-moral. Such defence, as it will become clear, is based on 
the centrality of phronesis (practical wisdom) and on its capacity to integrate 
the agent’s judgements and motives. 
I will begin my analysis by proposing a definition of moralism and a list 
of its main forms. There (§1) I will define moralism as the “perception of 
a moral judgment as inappropriately excessive”, and I will single out four 
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main forms of moralism, each of which corresponds to a different declination 
of this inappropriate excess. I will label them Inflexibility moralism (IM), 
Pervasivity moralism (PM), Extremeness moralism (EM) and Unentitlement 
moralism (UM).1 IM consists in answering “always” to the question of when 
one should act out of a moral norm, and has to do with presenting a rule as 
inflexible and independent from the particularity of experience. PM answers 
“everywhere” to the question of where value is in human life, and is related 
to conceiving morality as intrusive and devoid of boundaries. EM answers 
“to the utmost degree” to the question of the extent to which one should 
exercise morality; thus, it has to do with the imposition of too high a stan-
dard of morality, a standard we might identify with sanctity or heroism. UM, 
finally, answers “yes” to the question of whether or not the person passing 
her moral judgment on one’s action has the right to interfere with one’s moral 
life. Such form of moralism, as I will note, is distinct from the previous three, 
since it applies primarily to the person who issues a judgement, rather than to 
the judgement itself. Then, I will show that all these forms share the feature 
of expressing a kind of inappropriate excess. Secondly (§2), I will go on by 
listing the main features of the virtue-ethical perspective I embrace: (i) broad 
account of morality; (ii) qualitative account of the virtuous act; (iii) eude-
monistic perspective; (iv) recognition of degrees of virtue; (v) intersubjective 
approach to morality. Finally (§3), I will argue that such virtue-based norma-
tive approach can prevent a moralistic drift, insofar as it effectively avoids 
the mentioned charges. Indeed, it (i) acknowledges the need for interpreta-
tion of every contingent situation, rejects the primacy of inflexible norms, 
and conceives the moral agent as responsible for her own interpretation; 
(ii) has a non-extrinsic – that is, agent-related – account of the ubiquity of 
value, capable of resisting the charge of pervasivity; (iii) clearly distinguishes 
among different degrees of virtuousness, without imposing moral sanctity as 
a requirement and therefore avoiding the charge of extremeness; (iv) makes 
room for an account of relationships capable of accommodating ordinary 
intuitions on UM.
Thus, I will conclude that a virtue-based approach, thanks to its capacity of 
reconciling reasons and motives, and to its proposing an agent-related perspec-
tive on morality, not only is not liable of moralism, but has even an advantage 
in presenting moral requirements in a non-moralistic fashion. 
 1 I am extremely grateful to Gabriele De Anna, Valeria Ottonelli, Federico zuolo, and two anon-
ymous reviewers of this journal for their valuable comments.
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1. Moralism and moralisms
Moralism is an ordinary ethical experience.2 Indeed, if we think about our 
lives as moral agents, all of us can agree that some moral judgments are per-
ceived as moralistic (and therefore, something called moralism exists); thus, 
we all have at least an implicit knowledge of what moralism is, and, insofar 
as we label a judgment as moralistic, we imply such label to have a negative 
meaning. Thus, moralism appears to be a thick, value-laden concept, rather 
than just a descriptive one.3 We normally give the label of being moralistic 
primarily to judgments, and, only derivatively, to the people who issue them. 
Being moralistic, for someone, is not an intrinsic property, as being tall or Ital-
ian are; it is something other people think of someone in light of their frequent 
moralistic judgements. My first claim, then, is that a theory can be moralistic 
too, insofar as it is vulnerable to the same charge; i.e., insofar as it is a collection 
of moralistic moral claims and judgements, and/or is the actual source of such 
judgements. As we will see later on, except for one form of moralism, people 
are not the main subject of moralism.
But what does a moralistic judgement amount to? I will start by proposing a 
tentative definition.4 I define moralism as the “perception of a moral judgment 
as inappropriately excessive”. However, although I have a unitary definition, I 
also think moralism legetai pollakos, i.e., it can be said in many ways, and that 
when we formulate a judgement of moralism, we may refer to four main forms, 
each of which corresponds to a possible declination of the inappropriate ex-
cess which characterizes moralism. I label them Inflexibility moralism (IM), 
Pervasivity moralism (PM), Extremeness moralism (EM), and Unentitlement 
moralism (UM).5
 2  A similar outset, moving from common usages of the term, is conducted by Taylor 2012, al-
though his analysis of moralism, unlike mine, leads him to define it as a vice involving a lack of 
appropriate emotional responses of pity and recognition towards others. However, the way Taylor 
categorizes the distortion of judgement implied by moralism partly overlaps with mine; also, he raises 
the question of whether Aristotelian virtue ethics might be able to meet the objections he raises, but 
renounces to answer it (2012: 80). My paper, although moving from a different categorization, might 
somehow be taken as an indirect answer to such question.
 3  Here, I do neither aim at demonstrating the existence of moralism (which I take to be self-
evident), nor at assessing whether it is right to consider moralism as negative or not, but rather at 
exploring its actual application in ordinary moral language.
 4  Several other definitions have been proposed. Fullinwinder (2006: 10-11) sees moralism as a 
violation of our duty to be charitable towards other people’s behavior; Coady (2006: 25) as an attitude 
which damages the moral character of the moralistic agent; Archer (2017: 2) as “a disposition to en-
gage in inappropriate moral criticism”, which “undermines the force of legitimate moral criticism to 
morally blameworthy agents and states of affairs”.
 5 A similar independent analysis has been conducted by J. Driver, Moralism. Journal of Applied 
PI191-02-VAC.indd   31 04/04/2019   13:41:48
32 MArIA SIlVIA VACCArEzzA 
As the initial definition implies, all of these forms share the perception of a 
moral judgment as excessive. A judgment, thus, which exceeds either the ap-
propriate threshold of moral demandingness (IM and EM) – or the boundaries 
of morality itself (PM), or the limits of moral authority (UM). Passing on to 
another an inappropriate judgement, so as to make them follow that lead, is 
a quite serious charge. In this section, I will deepen these forms and see how 
they fit the general definition of moralism provided before. For each of the 
proposed types, I will offer an example, and I will then explain why it might be 
attributed to virtue ethics.
Inflexibility moralism consists in answering “always” to the question when 
one should act out of a moral norm, and has to do with presenting a rule 
as inflexible and independent from the particularity of experience. It is the 
moralism of the inflexible generalist, who takes rules as always applicable to 
similar cases without taking the specific features of the present situation in any 
particular account. IM judgements, people and theories are therefore exces-
sively inflexible and incapable of admitting of any need for interpreting rules. 
They appear also as abstract, insofar as they overlook the concreteness of each 
contingent situation by emphasising the general relevance of rules and norms. 
Abstractness is often accompanied by the perception of such judgements as 
extrinsic: general rules may be well said to be issued by autonomous rational-
ity, but they don’t take into any account either the role of practical reason in 
interpreting each situation, or that of emotions in responding to it.
Thus, judgements issued out of general rules are often perceived as moral-
istic, insofar as agents normally (a) assign a role to their own practical reason 
and emotional response, with their joint ability to interpret situations; (b) care 
quite a lot about their own autonomy, and don’t appreciate very much to be 
deprived of practical authority; (c) thus, they refuse to simply apply readymade 
rules or “slapdash universals” without any personal interpretation. 
IM. richard suggested me to tell the truth to my boss without knowing 
anything about the situation. 
When applied to VE, this particular charge of moralism is directed towards 
its generalist versions, such as, according to some readings, Thomistic – or in 
Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2005. However, unlike Driver, I don’t see moralism as an illicit use of 
moral considerations, but an excess of normative authority; i.e., as passing on another an excessive 
judgement. Also, I think my alternative categories to be more suitable to capture all possible allega-
tions against VE, as well as to allow me to show why VE can accommodate all anti-moralistic stances.
PI191-02-VAC.indd   32 04/04/2019   13:41:48
 VIrTUE ETHICS: AN ANTI-MOrAlISTIC DEFENCE 33
any case, natural-law-friendly – virtue theories.6 Within such an understand-
ing, the role of phronesis and virtue would be diminished, in that phronesis 
would be merely a capacity of drawing consequences from general invariant 
principles of conduct, known independently from one’s particular situation.
Pervasivity moralism answers “everywhere” to the question of where moral 
value is to be found in human life, and has to do with conceiving morality 
as intrusive and devoid of boundaries.7 We accuse someone of PM when she 
seems to cross the “horizontal” boundaries of the moral field, and to impose 
herself and others with moral standards belonging to what we take to be non-
moral domains. This is perceived as inappropriately excessive, in that it erases 
the line dividing what belongs to morality and what pertains to – say – good 
taste, manners, and personal values where nothing moral is apparently at stake. 
PM. Martha always reproaches me for saying swear words, for she thinks 
it’s an immoral behaviour.
Classic Aristotelian virtue ethics might be at first sight considered to be 
pervasive and over-prescribing, given the absence of boundaries between the 
moral and the non-moral, and the existence of an excellence which governs 
almost any domain of human experience. This allegedly pervasive approach 
is quite evident in the Nicomachean Ethics’ catalogue of the virtues, which 
includes excellences related to apparently non-moral fields, such as jokes and 
informal relationships (see NE II, 1108 a9 – 1108 b10; NE IV, 1126b 10 – 1128 
b9). In current VE, it is held by almost all Aristotelian ethicists, and its “lib-
eralized” version is paradigmatically expressed by Martha Nussbaum’s 1993 
paper, which singles out all the spheres of life, or areas in which experience is 
grounded, each of which has a virtue as its excellence (see Nussbaum 1993).
Extremeness moralism answers “to the utmost degree” to the question to 
which extent one should exercise morality; thus, it has to do with the imposi-
tion of too high a standard of morality, a standard we might identify with sanc-
tity or heroism. This kind of moralism, like the previous one, has to do with 
 6  For a similar reading of Thomistic virtue ethics, see e.g. Iris Murdoch’s effective critique, ac-
cording to which in a Natural law perspective “[…] the individual is seen as moving tentatively 
vis-à -vis a reality which transcends him. To discover what is morally good is to discover that real-
ity, and to become good is to integrate himself with it. He is ruled by laws which he can only partly 
understand. He is not fully conscious of what he is. His freedom is not an open freedom of choice in 
a clear situation; it lies rather in an increasing knowledge of his own real being, and in the conduct 
which naturally springs from such knowledge” (Murdoch 1997: 70; see also 1997: 269).
 7  I think the target of Williams’ 1985 critique of moralism might fall under this label.
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crossing the boundaries of morality. However, EM, unlike PM, crosses the 
boundaries “vertically”, or “from above”, insofar as it fails to identify different 
legitimate degrees of morality, with different standards of demandingness, and 
to account for the difference between what is morally required and what lies 
beyond morality (i.e., supererogation).
EM. Tony blames me for having bought a new bag instead of donating 
that sum to the poor. 
As applied to VE, EM can be seen in the charge of perfectionism, or the ac-
cusation of pointing to unattainable moral exemplars and ideals. This is nicely 
expressed in the debate over moral heroism or sanctity, and particularly in Su-
san Wolf’s critique to moral exemplars (Wolf 1982). In Wolf’s account, which 
is paradigmatic of a more general scepticism over moral heroism and sanctity, 
the latter would be an undesirable outcome, in that it would lead to an ex-
treme, inhuman life. 
There is, finally, a last form of moralism, which applies primarily to the per-
son who issues a judgement, rather than to the judgement itself. What I have 
labelled Unentitlement moralism, answers “yes” to the question whether or 
not the person expressing her moral judgment on one’s action has the right to 
interfere with one’s moral life. This is perceived as moralistic insofar as such 
person is not seen as entitled to express her opinion on one’s choices and ac-
tions, (i) either because she is a stranger, i.e. someone whose relationship with 
the agent is not close enough to make her enter one’s personal sphere, or be-
cause she is not herself morally admirable enough to justify her will to give 
advice; (ii) or because relying upon someone else’s judgement, however good 
it may be, implies ipso facto a lack of autonomy. This person’s interference in 
one’s behaviour, therefore, is perceived as inappropriate and excessive, for she 
lacks, for diverse reasons, moral authority over the agent.
UM1. How dares Sarah tell me what to do? She doesn’t care about me at 
all!/8 How dares Sarah to tell me what to do? She is much worse than me!9
 8  One of the most effective expressions of this idea can be found in the diary of Cesare Pavese, 
who once noticed, with bitter irony: “From someone who doesn’t want to share your destiny, you 
should neither accept a cigarette” (Cesare Pavese, The Burning Brand: Diaries 1935-1950).
 9  For this case, most languages have idiomatic expressions. Think to the English: “look who is 
talking!”, and its Italian equivalent, which refers to those people who preach from the pulpit without 
any right to do so. However, as Taylor notes, this particular kind of moralism amounts more to a form 
of hypocrisy, which is a related – yet not identical – vice ascribable to moral judgements and people 
(Taylor 2012: 7).
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UM2. How dares Sarah tell me what to do? Nobody else but me can 
know what it’s the right thing for me to do.
As I have noticed, this last accusation of moralism is the only one which 
refers primarily to people. However, it can be attributed derivatively to judge-
ments, not insofar as they are intrinsically moralistic (such as in the previous 
cases), but as they are issued by moralistic people (therefore, reversing the 
person-judgement order), and to theories, not in that they collect intrinsically 
moralistic judgements, but inasmuch as they don’t make enough theoretical 
room for strong relationships among moral agents, capable of justifying their 
mutual interfering in each other’s choices and actions. 
Given such premises, it can be easily seen that VE’s attitude of attribut-
ing a strong role to education and to the relations within a community would 
amount to a dangerous lack of focus on the individual and her autonomous 
agency, and a moralistic threat to one’s individual judgement. Equally risky 
would be pointing to the phronimos as an exemplar, not only for the reasons 
seen above, but also in that it would deprive the agent of her autonomy, and 
foster admiration, emulation and mimetic attitudes deemed as dangerous for 
personal autonomy. 
2. What kind of virtue ethics? 
In this section, I aim at showing that, on the one hand, VE can prevent 
the moralistic drifts seen so far, and, on the other, that it can broaden the 
boundaries of morality when required, i.e., when they become too narrow 
from within its perspective. This, against what is claimed by some, i.e., that 
VE often overlooks normative issues,10 would prove that VE is endowed with 
adequate theoretical tools to take a stand on the sources and boundaries of 
morality. Before explaining why and how virtue ethics can prevent the mor-
alistic drifts seen so far, let me step back, to define briefly what I take VE it 
to be. Obviously enough, there is no virtue ethics as such. VE is always some 
kind of virtue ethics, and I am well aware that many distinctions can be and 
have been made among kinds of virtue ethics. Generally speaking, the Aristo-
telian VE I embrace represents an ethical approach focused on the flourishing 
of the agent, which consists primarily in the development of virtues, defined 
as “persisting, reliable, and characteristic” (Annas 2011: 8) deep features of 
the person, responsible for the issuing not of merely automated responses, but 
of “selective responses to circumstances” (ibid.).
 10  Cf. what Onora O’Neill claims in her introduction to Korsgaard 1996: xii.
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To be slightly more analytical, such Aristotelian VE is committed to the fol-
lowing views: 
a. A broad (as opposed to a narrow) account of morality, which takes per-
sonal flourishing to be morally relevant and therefore includes a balance 
between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues as a consequence.11 
This, against the separation between the demands of duty (taken to be 
what morality consists in), and the demands of virtue – considered as 
pertaining to the ethical and making less requiring demands – rooted in 
the agent’s desires and aims (see Annas 2015). As noted by Slote (1995), 
narrow accounts (such as Kantian and utilitarian approaches) take only 
concern for the well-being of others as morally relevant, whereas Aristo-
tle’s account emphasizes both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues, 
assigning enormous ethical significance to the happiness of the agent. 
b. An account of character as the main focus of morality, and of character 
building as the primary moral task, as well as something that cannot but 
being pervasive. 
c. A qualitative account of the virtuous act, that is, the claim that acting virtu-
ously does not necessarily mean always exercising the virtue’s main act as 
much as you can, but hitting the right mean within a range of possibili-
ties, by means of an attentive sensitivity to the features of any situation. 
This implies taking virtues as “deep configurations of one’s feelings and 
thoughts, that do not bring about an automatic and a priori codifiable be-
havior, but a sensitivity to some moral reasons, a capacity to perceive the 
individual circumstance’s particular moral features” (Vaccarezza 2017).12 
Each virtue has, therefore, as stated by McDowell, a “relevant range of 
behavior” (McDowell 1998: 53), i.e., what Aristotle considered the con-
tinuum where the virtuous mean had to be found in each occasion.
d. A eudemonistic perspective, which includes:
i) A focus on personal flourishing as both the reason and 
motive of morality;
ii) A holistic goal view, according to which each virtue 
tends to the overall good of the agent and finds the right 
mean in its specific field while having the overall good in 
sight. This implies maintaining the primacy of a “quali-
fied generalistic” account of practical wisdom, which 
preserves both phronesis’ capacity of dealing with par-
ticulars, and perceiving them in their contingent detail, 
 11  See Slote 1999; Annas 2015; Carr 2016. 
 12  A more radical claim made by McDowell, is that virtue is a quasi-visual capacity (see NE III, 
1114b 6; McDowell 1998: 53). 
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and its openness to the knowledge of general ends (see 
Sherman 1989, 1997; Nussbaum 1990);
iii) An integrated view of the interaction between cognitive 
and emotional components, which need to be both pres-
ent in the agent in order for her to be genuinely virtuous.
iv) The recognition of degrees of virtue, from vices, to natu-
ral traits, to heroic virtues and supererogation (Swanton 
2003; Stangl 2016).
v) An intersubjective approach to morality, which empha-
sizes the role of shared values, admiration for exemplars, 
education and upbringing, and promotes extended al-
truism and other-regarding virtues.13 
3. A virtue-ethical response
Having listed briefly the main features of the Aristotelian virtue-ethical per-
spective I embrace, I will now draw their consequences, so to show how such 
an account can avoid the fourfold charge of moralism outlined above. If this 
attempt will prove successful, I will be in a position to argue that VE has the 
capacity to resist moralistic drifts, and that to do so it does not need to accept 
definite boundaries of morality.
As it is shown by its adopting a qualitative account of the virtuous act, and 
qualified generalism over the role of phronesis, in response to IM, VE acknowl-
edges the need for interpretation of every contingent situation and rejects the 
priority of inflexible general norms. This can be easily seen in the primacy 
assigned to phronesis, i.e., practical wisdom, the sovereign intellectual virtue 
which is responsible for an accurate moral perception and needs to operate 
in synergy with the other (ethical) virtues, i.e., with the emotional (rationally 
guided) sphere of the soul.14 
Previously, I have noticed that IM answers “always” to the question of when 
one should act out of a moral norm; more specifically, I take IM as making use 
of a “quantitative always”. VE, on the contrary, answers “always” to a different 
question, namely, that of when one should act out of virtue. Therefore, it makes 
 13  As noted by Annas 2015: 609, “Eudaimonism has been characterized so far in two ways. One is 
that of aiming at goals; normativity has taken the form of the attractive power of the good. In terms 
of a famous contrast, eudaimonism takes as basic the idea of attraction rather than that of command 
or imperative”. 
 14  The leading role of the virtues in perceiving the moral features of any situation has led many 
interpreters to envisage a priority of particularity in Aristotelian ethics, or even a particularistic per-
spective stricto sensu. See e.g. McDowell 1998.
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use of a “qualitative always”, which does not prescribe a standard action to ac-
complish, but rather – as I have noticed when sketching the qualitative account 
of the virtuous act – it aims at finding the right mean in a wide range of possibili-
ties, by means of an attentive sensitivity to the features of any situation. Thus, it 
keeps the source of morality within the agent, in her perceptive and creative re-
sponsibility, instead of moving it without. When a virtue theory prescribes me to 
be always virtuous overall, it leaves me entirely open the challenge of interpreting 
the situation to see which virtues are relevant here and now, and what does it 
mean to act out of that specific virtue. This does not necessarily imply holding 
a form of particularism; rather, it implies claiming that there is no top-down de-
duction from general rules to particular actions, but an interpretive bottom-up 
movement of finding the way to aim at general ends and principles in the given 
particular situation. Thus, holding that general principles and ends play a cen-
tral role in morality does not imply ipso facto being liable of the accusation of 
moralism, in that following principles and aiming at ends gives birth to different 
actions depending on the situation, which has to be creatively interpreted. 
In response to the allegation of PM, I think it is useful to distinguish be-
tween two similar but distinct concepts: the ubiquity and the pervasivity of 
value, the former being a legitimate trait of morality, and the latter its moralis-
tic degeneration. 
Given its eudemonistic focus on the flourishing of the agent, and on char-
acter building as the primary moral task, VE has an account of the ubiquity of 
value, capable of resisting the charge of pervasivity. Its non-moralistic way of 
answering “everywhere” to the question of the place of value in life, depends 
on the fact that phronesis aims at the happiness of the agent. If happiness and 
flourishing are the point of being moral, and the overall goal of morality, then 
it is no moralism to claim that every aspect of life should be included in the 
field of morality. Character building, furthermore doesn’t count as an excessive 
constraint, since once you’ve built a certain character you don’t have to pass a 
constant control from outside on your actions. 
This may be better understood by referring to the list of Aristotelian virtues, 
a list that covers almost every area of human life (see the central books of Ar-
istotle’s NE, but also Nussbaum’s 1993 reformulation mentioned above), jokes 
and wit included. In Aristotle’s perspective, it would be against the agent’s in-
terest to single out a non-moral field where to behave arbitrarily; also, it would 
contradict the common human experience of the “impossibility” to exit the 
domain of value. Something similar is nicely expressed by Iris Murdoch, when 
claiming that “all sorts of momentary sensibilities to other people, too shadowy 
to come under the heading of manners of communication, are still parts of 
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moral activity. (‘But are you saying that every single second has a moral tag?’ 
Yes, roughly.)” (Murdoch 1994: 495). 
In response to the third accusation, I maintain that VE, in its most refined 
versions, clearly distinguishes among different degrees of virtuousness, with-
out imposing moral sanctity and heroism (or supererogation) as a require-
ment, and therefore can avoid the charge of extremeness.15 There are both, 
indeed, a standard and a heroic level of virtue, depending (among other 
things) on the difficulty of the circumstances at hand. The first, is the level 
of ordinary morality, while the second belongs to sanctity, or to supereroga-
tion, and is compatible both with the doctrine of the virtues and with the 
so-called doctrine of the mean, in that “heroically virtuous people do not go 
to excess, but their actions remain at the high end of the intermediate range” 
(Curzer 2012: 142). Even if the second level may have an effect on the first, 
it cannot be the object of a moral requirement. Think, for example, to the 
role of moral exemplars, such as father Kolbe: what he did (volunteering to 
die, so to save another prisoner in Auschwitz) can be a source of inspiration, 
helping all of us understanding the importance of courage and selflessness. 
Thus, such deed can contribute to ordinary morality, without being in itself 
the object of a prescription.16 
In sum, supererogation, however conceived, exceeds the requirements of 
duty from above: VE, although rejecting a focus on duty, is capable of recogniz-
ing such difference by distinguishing between different degrees of virtue, and 
therefore by admitting heroic (supererogatory) virtue without attributing it the 
same degree of compulsoriness as ordinary virtue.17 Still, it is capable of recog-
nizing its value for ordinary morality, avoiding the risk of flattening morality.18
 15  A way to understand the different degrees of virtue is Swanton’s analysis of right actions, as 
different from virtuous actions. As rebecca Stangl notes, “in some circumstances, more than one 
virtuous action seems available, some of which are more virtuous than others”, since “there is much 
latitude in hitting the target of the virtues such as generosity. right acts range from the truly splendid 
and admirable to acts which are ‘all right’” (Swanton, Virtue Ethics, 240). “So, it seems that an action 
can be generous without being perfectly generous”. Also, “even a quasi-quantitative doctrine of the 
mean need not say that, in every situation, there is only one virtuous action that constitutes a mean” 
(Stangl 2016: 351; see also Curzer 142). However, in Aristotelian terms, the existence of degrees of 
virtuousness can be defended without appealing to a doctrine of right actions, conceived as distinct 
from virtuous ones. I will address at more length this point in the conclusion.
 16  The recent debate on supererogation and virtue is extremely lively and cannot be summa-
rized here. Besides the work just cited by Swanton, Stangl and Curzer, see, e.g., Kawall 2009; Crisp 
2013; Heyd, 2015. 
 17  See the example provided by Curzer 2012: 142.
 18  Something not too dissimilar to such potential flattening was what russian writer Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn had in mind when he gave his famous Harvard speech in 1978 “A society which is based 
on the letter of the law and never reaches any higher is taking very scarce advantage of the high level 
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As I have noticed before, UM has a particular status among the forms of 
moralism, since it is the only one that refers to the person issuing the judge-
ment, rather than to the judgement itself; in particular, I have distinguished 
between the charge of UM against strangers and non-admirable people. 
There are two moves VE allows us to do to avoid such charges, and to make 
room for an account of relationships capable of accommodating ordinary in-
tuitions on UM.
a. The first, amounts to conceiving of the relationships as central to mo-
rality. In a virtue-ethical perspective, people who strive for the virtuous 
life share a common aim and a common good capable of grounding 
a peculiar kind of familiarity. In Aristotle’s view, we may not be close 
friends, but our common belonging to a community that shares aims 
and values justifies the presence of a peculiar form of philia among us 
(as testified by the references in NE to politike philia, to the so-called 
social virtues, and to the nameless virtue resembling philia among fel-
low-citizens). Among people who seek to be virtuous (in a developmen-
tal perspective), there is no stranger as such.
b. This leads to the second point. The condition for someone to be entitled 
to judge and give advice to someone else is, precisely, that of striving for 
the virtue. This might not mean that she is actually virtuous, or phroni-
mos (i.e., endowed with practical wisdom). However, the phronimos is 
the regulative ideal of what everyone should look like in order to give 
advice.19 Aristotle explains that, besides sharing the common aim of be-
coming good, the phronimos is the actually virtuous human being, who is 
therefore capable of judging (see the annex virtue of gnome) and of giving 
advice to others (synesis); also, since she is morally exemplar, the phroni-
mos is admirable, which means that the other people entertain a relation 
of admiration with her, and they don’t perceive her as a stranger.20
For these two reasons, VE makes room for advice and judgements coming 
of human possibilities. The letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a beneficial influence on 
society. Whenever the tissue of life is woven of legalistic relations, there is an atmosphere of moral 
mediocrity, paralyzing man’s noblest impulses” (Solzhenitsyn 1978). 
 19  let me note incidentally that the phronimos is also the standard against which to evaluate 
whether the perception of a judgement as moralistic is reliable or not, whereas the merely continent 
(enkrates) person’s perception on the matter is unreliable, as well as the vicious’. Both might indeed 
perceive as external a judgement which contradicts their desires and/or better judgements, which 
happen to be wrong. See Kristjánsson 2013.
 20  A very convincing phenomenology of admiration is offered, among others, by linda T. zag-
zebski. See zagzebski 2006, 2010, 2015, 2017, where she defends the idea of the morally exemplar 
as “imitably attractive”. For a “logical geography” of the emotions targeting moral exemplarity, see 
Kristjánsson 2017. 
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from outside the self, but it does so only insofar as they are issued by some-
one who has some kind of meaningful relationship with the agent, be it prop-
er friendship, the sharing of common (virtuous) ends, or the bond between 
someone supremely admirable and the people admiring them. This, I claim, 
endows the person passing the judgement with enough moral authority over 
the agent – an authority attributed by the agent herself – not to be moralistic. 
This is also what allows VE to address the final charge against UM, i.e., that 
relying upon someone else’s judgement would imply a lack of autonomy. First, 
VE’s intersubjective approach to morality, and the central place it assigns to 
relationships, has goodness, virtue and personal flourishing as criteria against 
which to evaluate others.21 Second, virtuous relationships are chosen bonds; 
thus, they reflect and respect the agent’s own system of beliefs and values, and 
are an expression of, rather than a threat to, her autonomy. 
4. Conclusion: the demands of duty and the demands of virtue
In this paper, I have claimed that a virtue-based approach, thanks to its ca-
pacity of reconciling reasons and motives, and to its proposing an agent-related 
perspective on morality, can be defended from the charge of moralism. 
I think in conclusion I can move a little further in this inquiry, to explore 
VE’s advantages over rival approaches in presenting moral requirements in a 
non-moralistic fashion, and in providing insights over the proper (upper and 
external) boundaries of morality. What I suggest is that a strict, “Kantian” 
division between demands of virtue and a supposed categorical ought, repre-
senting the demands of right action, is exactly what leads to my initial defini-
tion of moralism.22 As noted by Annas, an approach focused on a sharp divi-
sion between what is right and what is virtuous accounts for the demands of 
duty in terms of something “coming from a source which is other than, and 
experienced as different from, her own practical reasoning and its sources” 
(Annas 2015: 613). Also, what makes this kind of demandingness special is 
that “it presents itself as external to the agent’s own practical reasoning and 
its sources in her or his desires, goals and aspirations” (ibid.). This, it is said, 
expresses the fact that that right action makes a categorical demand on us; 
 21  In zagzebski’s view, for example, although admiration is the primary source of moral knowl-
edge, it is also possible (and necessary) to criticize and rationally assess role models, in order to pre-
serve one’s own autonomy and make sure that one’s own admiration is directed to fitting (i.e., truly 
good) objects (see zagzebski 2015, 2017).
 22  recently, such a strong division has been emphasized by, e.g., Glasgow 2012; Horgan and Tim-
mons 2008. 
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and it is something eudaimonist ethical thinking should be able to account 
for as adequately as deontologist thinking. 
What is dominant here, as Annas remarks, is the «metaphor of externality», 
expressing the idea that any authentic moral demand “is external to the system 
of the agent’s desires, goals and aspirations which is normally the subject, and 
the source, of his practical reasoning. The special strong demand does not 
come from, and so is in no way dependent on, the person’s desires, preferences 
or goals. It comes from outside what we can call the practical self. Any demand 
which depends on any of the practical self’s aims, projects or desires only ap-
pears to be a demand” (ibid.). 
I think we are now in a position to evaluate the advantage of virtue ethics 
with regards to moralism as I have defined it throughout this paper. It is an 
approach, as far as I can see, which can make sense of moral demandingness, 
without referring to the metaphor of externality, i.e., without disposing of the 
practical self, with its motives, reasons, goals and aspirations, which all make 
part of the broad field of ethical thinking and reasoning.
Maria Silvia Vaccarezza
ms.vaccarezza@gmail.com
 DAFIST – University of Genoa
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